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Singapore: Reflections
and Implications of
Another Smart State
Clive Edwards
We have always realised that the only way to make a decent living for
our people was to make ourselves relevant to the needs of the region
and the world. So, as the region needed a place to buy and sell, we
became an entrepot. As multinational corporations, first from America,
then Japanese and European needed a low-cost production site to
maintain competitiveness, we provided the infrastructure, the tax
incentives and the trained workforce to encourage them to set up in
Singapore...But nothing remains constant. As these needs change, so
must we, to remain relevant to the people we do business with (Mah
Bow Tan, Senior Minister of State in Economic Development Board
1990b: 144).
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to analyse key elements of the development strategy of
Singapore since the mid-1960s. The paper describes the economic challenge faced by
Singapore in the mid-1960s, overviews contemporary world trends in foreign direct
investment, and uses competitiveness constructs developed by Michael Porter (1985) to
clarify key stages in the evolution of Singapore's development strategy. The paper argues
that the strategy has been successful because of unremitting top priority given to it by
Singapore's political leadership and because the political leaders charged a single
organisation, the Economic Development Board (EDB), with absolute authority to develop
and implement the strategy. The paper concludes with implications for Queensland's Smart
State initiatives.
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The Singaporean context
In less than 40 years, Singapore has converted itself from one of the poorer countries
of the world, with per capita income of less than AUD1 000 a year and extensive
unemployment and underemployment, to a city-state that matches the more successful
cities in developed countries in terms of living conditions (housing, health, education,
public transport, greenery, cultural and recreational facilities) and global linkages
(telecommunications, air and shipping facilities, financial institutions). In 1965
comparatively few Singaporeans had more than four years of primary education
whereas most Singaporeans now complete some form of post-secondary education.
Per capita income is now similar to that of Australia. Unemployment is low. How
was this transition achieved?
Some aspects of the social and political environment have undoubtedly assisted
these dramatic developments. During the entire period covered in this paper, political
life in Singapore has been dominated by one political party, the Peoples Action
Party (PAP): there has been no effective opposition. Singapore is a city-state and
does not face the inter-state rivalry and rural-urban divide characteristic of Australia.
Moreover, the Singaporean authorities have the power to plan the development of
Singapore unhindered by vested private property interests (in this respect, Singapore
parallels the position of the Australian Capital Territory): for example, if Singapore's
mass rail transport network needs to be extended, the best route can be chosen and
the extension can be completed as quickly as engineering practicalities allow.
These realities help explain three factors that contributed to Singapore's
development: (1) the ability to focus on one issue, the integration of Singapore into
a rapidly developing global economy; (2) the ability to pursue a development
strategy consistently over a comparatively long period, thirty-five years thus far;
and (3) the ability to develop Singapore's manpower resources and infrastructure
(roads, rail services, port, air services, telecommunications) in ways that facilitated
implementation of its development strategy. While these realities limit the scope
for replicating Singapore's strategy, an understanding of the key elements of that
strategy can nevertheless have value for policy development and application in
other quite different contexts.
Useful strategy constructs
In hindsight, two constructs can be used to clarify Singapore's development strategy,
including its evolution over time. Both constructs were advanced by the American
business academic Michael Porter in 1985 in seeking to explain how a firm could
develop advantage over competitors (Porter, 1985).
Porter noted that firms were organizations that undertook many related yet
different activities. He referred to the activities undertaken by a particular firm as
that firm's 'value chain'. Figure 1 shows Porter's generic representation of a firm's
value chain. Porter divided a firm's activities into two broad groups: those concerned
with production, distribution and marketing of the products produced by the firm,
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which he called the firm's primary activities, and those concerned with the
management of the firm, the firm's support activities. Support activities include
technology research, product research, financial management, strategic planning,
and management of the firm's relations with suppliers and distributors, inter alia.
This is the first useful construct. We shall begin to see its usefulness in the context
of Singapore's development strategy in the next section, which considers different
forms of foreign direct investment.
Figure 1: Porter's generic value chain (Porter 1985:37)
The second construct categorises different strategies a firm could pursue to
develop advantage over competitors. Porter distinguished four generic strategies
(Figure 2). A firm could seek to gain advantage over competitors by being a low-
cost supplier. The firm could develop skills that enabled it to gain this form of
advantage either over a wide range of products (strategy 1: cost leadership) or for
a single or narrow range of products (strategy 3A: cost focus). Alternatively, a firm
could seek to gain advantage by differentiating its products from those of competitors
(eg. by consistently producing products of higher quality than those available from
competitors); it could attempt to do this for many products (strategy 2) or for a
single or narrow range of products (strategy 3B).
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Figure 2: Porter's generic strategies (Porter 1985:12)
In his 1985 publication, Porter focussed on ways a firm could implement one
of these four strategies by understanding the potential contribution of different
activities within the firm's value chain to the selected strategy. Although developed
for a different purpose, this framework can constructively be used to clarify the
different emphases in the development strategy pursued in Singapore since the
mid-1960s.
Developments in foreign direct investment (FDI) from the 1950s
When Singapore was searching for a viable development strategy in the late 1950s,
the main form of FDI was what is now referred to as multi-domestic FDI. A firm,
generally from one of the more developed countries of the world, established
operations in a foreign country, and did so by replicating the value chain it had
developed at its home location in the foreign country. Because value chain replication
was the common form of FDI, host governments developed policies to deal with
this form of FDI. Where market size was small and acted as a disincentive for such
FDI, host governments offered assistance; a common form of assistance was the
imposition of trade barriers to reduce if not eliminate competition from imports.
While attitudes to FDI differed across countries, a more critical evaluation of
the benefits and costs of multi-domestic FDI emerged in the 1950s and 1960s,
especially in developing countries, but also in some more developed countries (e.g.
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France). As a result, many countries progressively discouraged FDI (e.g. the various
countries of Central and South America, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Japan and
South Korea).
In the late 1950s, a new form of FDI emerged. The initial source of this FDI
was America. At this time, the American economy was growing strongly, trade
barriers were being reduced and the American dollar was strong. American firms
were facing intensified competition not only from other competing American firms
but also from imports. The strong dollar meant that wage costs for all categories
of labour were high in America relative to other countries. In response, management
of some firms began to ask whether they could reduce per unit production costs by
undertaking particular value chain activities - those that were intensive in their use
of low-skill labour - in countries where labour costs were considerably lower than
in America. This was the beginning of what is now referred to as the globalisation
of production.
Garments, footwear, electrical goods and toys were amongst the first American
industries to experience this competitive pressure. In these industries, most of what
Porter refers to as the firm's operations (that is, production-line) activities (Figure 1)
were highly labour-intensive and demanded relatively unskilled labour. Some firms
in these industries shifted these production-line activities offshore, initially to Puerto
Rico where labour costs were much lower than in America. Progressively, these
American firms became distributors of imported products, and increasingly focussed
attention in their American-based operations on product design, distribution and
marketing. Over time, many realised that they could sub-contract production to
reliable suppliers at the foreign location, rather than become involved in FDI itself.
They also realised that Puerto Rico was not as hospitable as a host nation for such
activities as some East Asian countries, particularly China: Taiwan (hereafter,
Taiwan), South Korea and Hong Kong.
In the 1960s, the range of American industries affected by intense competitive
pressures increased. While firms in some of these industries were able to subcontract
production of components that essentially required large amounts of relatively
unskilled labour in their production to indigenous firms in Taiwan or Hong Kong,
for example, other firms - especially those in the emerging electronics industries
- were reluctant to sub-contract for a variety of reasons, including the need to
protect proprietary knowledge, to reap benefits from scale production, or to guarantee
just-in-time delivery, etc. For such diverse reasons, they preferred wholly owned
FDI. From the late 1960s, this form of FDI grew in importance in total FDI flows
(which continued to be dominated by multi-domestic FDI).
Interestingly, comparatively few countries were aware of this new form of FDI,
and even fewer countries explicitly moved to attract such FDI. Taiwan had been
alerted to outsourcing developments by American firms by American advisers in
the late 1950s. The government developed a fully serviced free-trade zone at
Kaohsiung to attract such investment in the early 1960s (the zone was opened in
1965, and two further zones were developed shortly thereafter). While the zones
were successful, small-scale Taiwanese firms began to dominate Taiwan's export
performance from the late 1960s, especially after the government introduced bonded
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warehouse arrangements (which permitted firms to get access to imported goods on
a duty-free basis provided those imports were used totally in the production of
products for export). Many small Taiwanese firms became subcontractors to
American, Japanese and West European firms, and FDI played a progressively
smaller role in Taiwan's sustained rapid growth after 1970.
Partly because it feared Japanese domination of its industrial development,
South Korea purposely discouraged FDI. Like Taiwan, some South Korean firms
became major subcontractors to American and Japanese firms. Unlike the situation
in Taiwan, a comparatively small number of large firms (called chaebols) dominated
this development. Hong Kong also benefited, but mainly as a subcontractor; it
received comparatively little FDI and the government did not deliberately target
this new form of FDI. Singapore, and to a lesser extent Malaysia, were the only
countries that quickly identified this opportunity and consciously moved to maximise
their involvement in this new form of FDI.
In the early 1970s, most other countries in the world were oblivious to emergent
trends that were signalling the gradual globalisation of production. Australia's
interest in FDI flows was focussed entirely on multi-domestic (that is, full value
chain transfer) FDI. Australia welcomed multi-domestic FDI, but the government
did not go out of its way to seek such FDI and, when opportunities arose, an FDI
Board scrutinised proposals to ensure that potential benefits to the nation outweighed
potential costs (such as those associated with a reduction in competition). The
same focus and attitudes prevailed in most South American and South Asian
countries.
While firms in America and other more developed countries initially moved
production-line activities that were intensive users of comparatively unskilled labour
to developing countries where labour costs were considerably lower (and, in the
event, mainly to East Asian countries), managers of these firms were aware that
their respective value chains consisted of several different activities and that the
resource demands of the various activities differed. Many required skilled labour
but different types of skilled labour (electrical engineering, mechanical engineering,
financial skills, and so on). Over time, firms have outsourced a wider range of their
value chain activities to countries where there is a cost or other advantage (research
agglomeration, for example), some through subcontracting, others through FDI. At
least for some firms, what started as the globalisation of specific production-line
activities (the operations box in Figure 1) has now extended to exploration of
globalisation opportunities for almost all of the activities that make up the firm's
value chain. Singapore has taken full advantage of this transition.
To understand the dilemmas faced by the Government of Singapore in the mid-
1960s, it is instructive to review key developments in Singapore in the 1950s and
1960s.
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Singapore in the mid-1960s: key political and economic challenges
In September 1963, Singapore joined with the Federation of Malaya (peninsular
Malaya), Sabah and Sarawak to form Malaysia. Singapore's Prime Minister, Lee
Kuan Yew, had been a strong proponent of this initiative, so much so that he was
prepared to weather a major split within the PAP which led to the resignation of
many members and the formation of potentially significant, socialist, opposition
party, the Barisan Socialis. Lee anticipated that the formation of Malaysia would
permit Singapore to become the main centre for the production of manufactured
goods for sale within Malaysia.
From the time of Singapore's establishment by Raffles in 1817, Singapore had
been a free-trade area and it had rapidly become the pre-eminent service centre in
South East Asia. A significant share of the output of the region destined for export
markets (e.g. natural rubber and tin) transited through Singapore and, similarly, a
significant share of the goods imported from the rest of the world by the South East
Asian region transited first through Singapore. Thus Singapore was the commercial
and financial centre for the region. It was the hub through which labour, mainly
from China and India, moved into South East Asia in the boom years from 1900
to 1930, and out of the region during the depression years. It had some manufacturing
activities, mainly centred on the reprocessing of regional produce destined for
export to West Europe, America and Japan, and on supplying processed food
products into the South East Asian region, and it was an important repair and
maintenance centre for the region.
In the 1950s, these various entrepot activities failed to provide the impetus to
growth in Singapore that they had prior to the depression and war. Indonesia was
struggling to gain control of its economic destiny from its long-time colonial master,
the Dutch. Sumatra, which had been as economically important to Singapore as
peninsular Malaya, was in turmoil. By 1960, the economic outlook for Indonesia
was rapidly deteriorating. The trade of southern Thailand, most of which had gone
to Singapore, was in decline as both tin and rubber production stagnated. Peninsular
Malaysia was attempting to reduce its dependence on Singapore by developing its
own ports. As a result, Singapore's growth during the 1950s was sluggish and
erratic.
When Lee Kuan Yew became Prime Minister in 1959, he was well aware that
Singapore urgently needed new growth avenues. Its population, mainly Chinese,
was rising, very young (45 per cent under 20 years of age) and, for the main part,
very poor. Stagnation during the 1950s meant that there was substantial
unemployment as well as extensive underemployment. Housing conditions were
poor and deteriorating, electricity supply was unreliable, water was available for
only a few hours each day, garbage littered the streets, sanitation was poor, and
comparatively few children completed primary education. Unions had grown in
strength in the 1950s, and there were many strikes and several violent skirmishes
between unionists and police. There was growing support for Mao Tse Tung and
communism, especially amongst the poorer Chinese in Singapore.
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Lee Kuan Yew saw the formation of Malaysia as the potential panacea. He was
prepared to sacrifice Singapore's free port status to encourage foreign manufacturers
to establish operations in Singapore behind trade barriers to supply the regional
market. Swampland at Jurong in the southwest of Singapore was drained and a
large, fully serviced industrial estate was developed, complete with factories that
could be rented. The first of numerous high-rise flats was constructed adjacent to
the estate to house workers. Firms that produced manufactured products that had
not previously been produced in Singapore were eligible for attractive 'pioneer
industry' tax concessions. The adversarial industry-based industrial relations system
inherited from the British was summarily dismantled in the early 1960s and replaced
by the consensual enterprise-based system prevalent in Japan. A dedicated
organization was created to seek and assist foreign investors (the Economic
Development Board, EDB).
By early 1965, a little over a year after the formation of Malaysia, Lee Kuan
Yew's expectations had been dashed. The federal government, based in Kuala
Lumpur, favoured industrial development, but in peninsular Malaya (at Shah Alum
near Kuala Lumpur) rather than in Singapore. While there was considerable multi-
domestic type FDI in Malaysia between 1963 and 1965, attracted by tax concessions
and border tariff protection, little was allocated by the federal government to
Singapore. In addition, there were acrimonious disputes over the financial
contribution of Singapore to the federal government, over the share of ethnic
Malays in Singapore's civil service, and over the participation of the two major
political parties - the multi-ethnic but Malay dominated UMNO in peninsular
Malaya and the PAP in Singapore - in elections both in Singapore and in Malaysia.
In August 1965, Singapore withdrew from Malaysia and became a separate republic.
In 1966, Singapore's economic problems worsened. Malaysia worked vigorously
to reduce its trade and other commercial links with Singapore, and intensified its
efforts to develop manufacturing industries in peninsular Malaysia. Indonesia's
economy was at the point of collapse. The British government announced that it
would close its defence base in Singapore; the base was an important employer of
labour, and accounted for over 20 per cent of Singapore's GDP. Unemployment
was high and rising, and large numbers were joining the labour-force each year, a
consequence of very high fertility in the 1950s. The most pressing problem facing
Singapore's leaders was to find jobs for Singaporeans.
Evolution of a development strategy
Phase 1: A low-cost production centre
Singapore's development options had narrowed. It was locked out of the regional
market. With just 2 million people, its home market could not support viable
development. Through the 1960s, Singapore's leaders made several trips to other
East Asian countries to observe their development progress and strategies. There
were many similarities between Singapore and Hong Kong. Both had been British
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colonies, both were free trade ports, and entrepot activities had dominated the
economies of both colonies. In 1951, China entered the Korean War. The United
Nations imposed a ban on trade between China and member countries of the
United Nations. In consequence, Hong Kong's thriving entrepot activities were
curtailed almost overnight. Unemployment rose, aggravated by a continuing
significant flow of emigrants from the Chinese mainland. Progressively through the
1950s, Hong Kong found a new development direction. Small indigenous Chinese
firms began to import fabric, fashion it into garments, and export the garments to
the world market. A host of other labour-intensive, almost totally export-oriented
industries emerged: watches, radios and other simple electrical or battery-operated
goods, footwear, handbags, toys, wigs, plastic kitchenware, basic hardware items
and so on. By the mid-1960s, Hong Kong was thriving, and manufacturing was a
major new sector of its economy.
Taiwan also captured the interest of the Singaporean authorities. In the late
1950s and early 1960s, its government made numerous policy adjustments designed
to reduce a strong bias against exporting. By the late 1960s, Taiwan was growing
rapidly and the main basis for that growth was exports of labour-intensive
manufactures dominantly to America. Several aspects of Taiwan's experience were
of lasting interest to the Singaporean visitors including the focus of the government
on encouraging and promoting exports of manufactures, the positive attitude towards
FDI, especially where such FDI was mainly export-oriented (and the importance
attached not just to attracting FDI from developed countries but also to seeking
Chinese in other parts of Asia, particularly Hong Kong, to shift their business to
Taiwan), the significant and growing contribution of small indigenous Taiwanese
firms to the nation's exports, and the importance of low-skill, labour-intensive
subcontracted activities, principally linked to American firms, including large
American retail chains, in Taiwan's exports.
By early 1966, the Singaporean authorities accepted that Singapore had to
rapidly convert itself from a service-dominated economy to one where manufacturing
was a major employer of labour and where the bulk of manufacturing output was
exported to world markets (Goh 1977; Hon 1997). As in Hong Kong, Singapore's
economy at this time was dominated by small firms. While it was appreciated that
many small firms in Hong Kong had switched from service to manufacturing
activities when their traditional business had been eliminated almost overnight in
the early 1950s, the Singaporean authorities had no confidence that small firms in
Singapore would emulate that experience, and certainly no confidence that such a
transition would occur within a time frame that would address Singapore's rapidly
worsening employment outlook. It was therefore decided that the best approach
was to attract foreign firms to Singapore.
Since Singapore had comparatively cheap, unskilled labour, the authorities
considered the most appropriate firms to attract were those that employed such
labour. From their experience, the authorities knew that these firms dominated the
exports of Hong Kong and Taiwan. As a result, determined efforts were made to
attract firms in Hong Kong and Taiwan to set up subsidiaries in Singapore or to
transfer their entire operations to Singapore. At the same time, though with less
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confidence, efforts were made to encourage FDI from other countries in the world,
including America, Europe, Japan and Australia.
To implement this strategy, the EDB was re-organised. Far greater emphasis
was given to its nascent overseas investment-seeking operations. Its offices in
Hong Kong, New York and London were strengthened, and new offices were
opened in West Europe, Japan and Australia. The task of staff at these overseas
offices was to approach firms and alert them to the advantages of Singapore as
location for FDI. The task of staff in the EDB's Singapore office was to act as a
one-stop centre where all problems faced by potential foreign investors were resolved
promptly. Income tax concessions were re-jigged in 1968 to reward growth in
earnings from exports. Since production for the Malaysian market was no longer
an option, the government indicated that it would not offer tariff protection to new
foreign investors and that it would progressively reduce tariff protection that had
been provided to some foreign investors in the early 1960s.
In these early days, the Singapore authorities were prepared to accept any FDI
proposals. They were unsure as to whether there would be much interest. In their
promotional literature, stress was placed on the advantage of plentiful, cheap labour
and of Singapore's globally oriented doing-business environment, a valued legacy
of the prominent role Singapore played as an entrepot centre for South East Asia
(Goh 1977, 1995; Ron 1997). In terms of Porter's generic strategies (Figure 2), the
Singaporean authorities effectively viewed Singapore as a low-cost production
centre (Strategy 1)
In the event, Singapore gained investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan, in
garments, footwear, food and consumer electrical products. It also gained FDI from
some large, successful multinational firms, mainly from America (National
Semiconductor, Texas Instruments and Fairchild) and West Europe (Rollei from
West Germany). By 1972, jobs associated with the flow of FDI into Singapore had
significantly reduced the unemployment problem. The investment from Hong Kong
and Taiwan was multi-domestic FDI; firms from these countries transferred their
full value chain to Singapore. In contrast, most of the investment undertaken by the
multinational firms consisted of the transfer of particular labour-intensive production
line activities to Singapore. These firms did not seek to replicate their full value
chain in Singapore; rather they sought to gain advantage from what they saw as
Singapore's comparative strength in a global context, cheap labour.
Phase 2: The switch to a focussed low-cost production centre
The EDB monitored FDI approvals closely. The government and the EDB were
anxious that FDI made a contribution to Singapore's development beyond the
provision of jobs. At this time, their interest centred on the training of Singaporean
labour and advice on how Singapore could make its 'doing-business' environment
more attractive to foreign investors. In respect of these goals, the EDB quickly
noted a major difference between what the firms from Hong Kong and Taiwan
could offer and what the multinational firms could offer. They also noted that the
firms from Hong Kong and Taiwan were sensitive to small labour cost differences
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across countries (several relocating to Malaysia or Thailand after a few years in
Singapore), that many were not comfortable with the close monitoring of their
operations required by the EDB, and that, in financial terms, many were borderline
operations and some failed.
Consequently, from the early 1970s, the EDB began to focus on attracting one
group of firms to Singapore, globally successful multinational firms, on addressing
the requirements of these firms, and on encouraging these firms to train Singaporean
labour and to upgrade the skills of local firms so that some could become component
suppliers to specific multinational firms (Goh, 1995). In terms of Figure 2, Singapore
shifted from a general low-cost strategy, where it sought FDI of any type and from
any country, to a focussed strategy, but one where the advantage of being in
Singapore still rested on low costs, especially of labour and progressively of other
infrastructure costs (port and air freight services, telecommunications). In almost
all instances, these multinational firms sent specific labour-intensive production-
line activities to Singapore. They did not undertake multi-domestic FDI. Rather
they sent particular components to Singapore for further processing in fully-owned
subsidiaries that they had set up in Singapore, and the processed components were
then air-freighted or shipped back to the parent firm for reincorporation in the
production process.
During this period, the EDB strengthened its presence in America, opening
offices in Boston and San Francisco, increased the number of its offices in West
Europe and Japan, and wound back or closed its offices in Hong Kong and Australia.
Through the first half of the 1970s, the focus of the EDB was on getting to know
multinational firms in their home territory, highlighting the advantage of locating
labour-intensive production-line activities in Singapore, and convincing them to
locate in Singapore. The sales effort was very targeted and very successful, and a
large number of multinational firms established subsidiaries in Singapore in the
1970s.
Since the multinational firms were sending components to Singapore for further
processing, the need to improve the efficiency of Singapore's port and airport
became a major consideration. In the early 1980s, a new state-of-the-art airport was
opened at Changi and the Port of Singapore became one of the largest and most
efficient container ports in the world. Meanwhile, the government reoriented the
education system, placing top priority on vocational education (with an emphasis
on electrical, electronic, mechanical and precision engineering), using English as
the learning medium. It also implemented fiscal, monetary and labour policies
designed to ensure a 'no surprise' business environment.
Singapore's labour market tightened through the 1970s. By the mid-1970s, it
was clear that real wages would rise in the near future. The labour force was
becoming more skilled, and the education system was now able to guarantee a
rapidly growing supply of vocationally trained labour. Starting around 1972-73, the
EDB began to talk to multinational firms about relocating progressively higher-
skill production-line activities to Singapore and, after 1975, this objective became
a primary focus of the EDB.
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Phase 3: From focussed low-cost to focussed differentiation strategy
In the late 1970s and through the first half of the 1980s, wage increases in Singapore
were large each year and outpaced growth in labour productivity. Singapore's
foreign clients found that the profitability of their operations in Singapore was
being eroded. For the first time in over a decade, growth in the flow of FDI to
Singapore slowed in 1984 and the economy suffered a sharp slowdown in late
1985. Economic growth was slightly negative in 1986, after a twelve-year period
when growth in real terms had averaged close to 10 per cent a year. The government
immediately set up a review committee, and its report, called the New Directions
Report (Ministry of Trade and Industry 1986), set the parameters for Singapore's
subsequent development.
The committee recognised the paramount importance of FDI to Singapore and
recommended that the government slash the costs of doing business in Singapore,
which it did. It noted that Singapore had focussed on encouraging multinational
firms to do production-line activities in Singapore, at first unskilled labour-intensive
activities, then more skill-intensive activities and, by 1985, increasingly sophisticated,
clean room activities. The report indicated that multinational firms were now
outsourcing what Porter referred to as support activities (Figure 1), and it
recommended that Singapore should position itself to attract these and other
knowledge-intensive service activities. Towards this end, it recommended that the
incentives developed to attract manufacturing activities be extended to service
sector activities. The government agreed. Amongst East Asian countries, Singapore
was the first to acknowledge the potential importance of service sector activities
to its future development and the first to encourage multinational firms to outsource
some of their service (or in Porter's terminology, support) activities to Singapore.
At a follow-up strategy conference in 1990, designed 'to update and inform our
corporate clients on the economic repositioning of Singapore' (and entitled World
Class Partnership), Lee Kuan Yew pointed out that the resources for sustained per
capita income growth (the various activities of multinational firms, technology,
information, professional people) were now globally mobile and could be tapped
with appropriate policies. Referring to Singapore and Ireland in particular, he
added 'those countries that have plugged themselves into this system have prospered'
(EDB 1990b: 194; see also Encarnation and Wells 1986; McKendrick, Doner and
Haggard 2000). The EDB in its 1990 Annual Report developed this theme further:
In a world where resources are increasingly mobile, the state of a
countries [sic] infrastructure becomes a crucial factor in determining
where global firms locate high knowledge activities. Traffic congestion,
pollution, overused and under maintained facilities count against you
(EDB 1990a:26).
Senior Minister of State, Dr Lee Boon Yang, developed this point further:
A few months ago, I met a senior banker from Hong Kong. He
complained that the Singapore government must have too much money
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because so much is spent to keep the city clean, green and in full
bloom. Not that he minded, but as a banker, he was pained to see
resources 'wasted'. Is it waste? All top-class hotels take care to
manicure their gardens and flowerbeds because the total ambience is
part of the total product being sold. It is exactly the same for Singapore
as a city. Access to fine food, to art and music, to golf courses, to
clean beaches, can be as important as the efficiency of our port, airport
and telecommunications system. We have to keep improving and
upgrading because the international competition is relentless. The whole
world needs no more than, say, 40 or 50 major switching nodes and
we have to work very hard to maintain our rating (EDB 1990b: 167).
In effect, the authorities were indicating that the type of multinational business
activities that Singapore was now targeting meant that its main competitors were
not Penang, Bangkok, Shanghai or Guangzhou, but Boston, San Francisco, Dublin
and other cities in developed countries.
In 1991, the government published a further report entitled Singapore's Strategic
Economic Plan (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1991). The report indicated that
other countries in Asia and elsewhere in the world offer multinational firms
competitive low-cost business environments. It emphasised that the task facing
Singapore was to move the nation away from competitiveness based on low costs
(strategies 1 and 2a in Figure 2) to competitiveness based on national competencies
and capabilities (strategy 3b). Senior Minister of State, Mah Bow Tan, encapsulated
the new strategy emphasis when he said:
Our principle in managing Singapore's competitive position is simple:
any increase in costs can be sustained only if we develop Singapore's
capabilities to a level that justifies the higher costs and enable industries
to be internationally competitive...To sustain an upward movement in
our costs, we must first raise the level of Singapore's capabilities so
that Singapore's value to customers is correspondingly increased (EDB
1990b: 146, italics added).
In the 1990s, attention has focussed on further developing its infrastructure (for
example, integrating the state-of-the-art port and airport), extending and deepening
computer and English language literacy, giving higher priority to university and
post-graduate education while enhancing vocational education, and making Singapore
a congenial place within which to live and do business. In effect, the authorities
are progressively shaping Singapore in ways that encourage its multinational clients
to view Singapore as if it were a leading city physically located within the
multinational client's home country, be it America, West Europe or Japan. The
recently signed (November 2002) free trade agreement with America is a logical
step in this direction.
A 1998 report of a committee set up to reassess Singapore's competitiveness in
the wake of the Asian financial crisis (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1998)
indicated that Singapore ought to aim to become an advanced and globally
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competitive knowledge economy within the next decade, where the basis for
competitiveness would be the physical capability to access knowledge and the
intellectual capital to absorb, process and apply knowledge. The report added that,
to develop into a knowledge economy, Singapore should be an open cosmopolitan
society, attractive to global talent and connected with other global nodes. It stated
that Singapore should aim to master a few high growth, high value-added, knowledge
intensive niches in manufacturing and in services that suit Singapore's capabilities
and cost structure. Towards this end, the committee indicated that the goal of
government policy would be to develop world-class capabilities and competencies
in relevant niche areas including health care, education (with an emphasis now on
post graduate education) and media, all with a focus on the Asian region, and
information technology.
The committee emphasised the importance of FDI to Singapore's future but
suggested that in addition to encouraging multinational firms to do high knowledge
activities in Singapore, effort should now be directed to encouraging successful
service sector firms in America, West Europe and Japan to replicate their whole
value chain in Singapore: the aim should be to develop a business environment that
attracts and anchors the world's top service companies in targeted sectors to tap
opportunities in Asia.
Emerging issues for Singapore
Singapore weathered the 1997-98 Asian financial crises reasonably well, largely
because of the significant role of multinationals in its economy, which meant that
its fortunes were related as much to global developments as to regional developments.
However Singapore is now more aware of the importance of developments in the
South East Asian region as a whole to its future. In recent years, China has attracted
a growing share of FDI flows into East Asia and there are indications that the
competitive position of several South East Asian countries vis-a-vis China has
deteriorated. Growing appreciation of terrorist networks in neighbouring countries
is likely to aggravate this development, with potential adverse effects for both FDI
flows to the region and the economic performance of the region. Because service
activities must play a more important role in Singapore's economy in the years
ahead, the performance of the neighbouring region assumes increasing importance
for Singapore. Added to this, Singapore's economic performance was adversely
affected in 2001/02 by the sluggish performance of the world electronics industry.
At the strategy level, Singapore has been exhibiting some confusion in recent
years. It is anxious to promote research activities in Singapore. It is aware that
many small firms in Taiwan are innovative and are developing branded products
in the business-to-business international trade area, a significant achievement.
Singapore has a large number of small locally owned firms, but these firms do
comparatively little research. While strategy considerations dictate that Singapore
ought to focus on attracting research activities of multinationals, the Singapore
authorities want to make the nation's small firms more entrepreneurial and
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innovative. However, the main institutions in Singapore are used to dealing with
large, multinational firms, and the supportive networking amongst small firms that
characterises the business environment in Taiwan, extending to venture capital
arrangements, is not present in Singapore.
Implications for Queensland's 'Smart State' initiatives
Singapore's development strategy emerged at a time when Singapore's options
were severely circumscribed and when there was a paramount need to address one
critical problem: high and rising unemployment. As noted, Singapore's circumstances
are quite unique in a global context: it is a small urban State with a democratically
elected parliament, but one political party, the PAP, has totally dominated the
political scene since 1959. In addition, it has succeeded in transforming itself from
a very poor country in the 1950s where wage rates and educational levels were low
(with however a good globally-oriented infrastructure, extending from ports to
financial institutions, and a populous used to involvement in regional and global
mercantile business) to a situation today where wages are quite high and the doing
business environment is comparable to that of some of the best more globally
oriented cities in advanced countries. For these and other reasons, the totality of
Singapore's experience from 1965 to 2000 is not directly relevant - in the sense
of being replicated - to any other country in the world. Yet there are several
valuable pointers in Singapore's experience, and the fact that Ireland has benefited
considerably by pursuing some of the elements central to Singapore's strategy (for
example, the targeting of high knowledge activities outsourced by American
multinational firms) ought encourage closer consideration of Singapore's recent
development experience (see for example Edwards, 1992).
At least five general points are relevant. First, Singapore's experience suggests
that, if a Smart State initiative is to gain traction, commitment to that initiative
ought be the government's top priority.
Secondly, a Smart State initiative needs to be the top priority of any potential
alternative State government; that is, there is a need for bipartisan agreement on
main elements of a Smart State initiative. Singapore's success can be attributed in
large measure to its ability to pursue a consistent development strategy over a long
period of time. As circumstances changed (for example, wages rose and educational
levels improved), the emphasis in the strategy changed but the basic goals remained
(the emphasis on working FDI, the emphasis on continuous micro-economic reform
across all of Singapore's globally oriented infrastructure, the emphasis on getting
progressively better and better-paying jobs for Singaporeans, inter alia). A Smart
State initiative ought be thought of in the context of an on-going program for
decades, rather than for four or eight years.
Thirdly, Singapore's experience points to the need for a semi-independent public
organization to champion the cause. In Singapore this task was given to the Economic
Development Board (Low et al 1993; Schein 1996), and the government made it
abundantly clear to other departments that, in respect of matters relating to FDI and
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Singapore's development strategy, the EDB had absolute authority; to get foreign
investors settled into Singapore quickly, the EDB could expect and would obtain
the full and immediate cooperation of other departments affected by the investment
(supply of factory space, power, water, etc). The EDB has always been led by
energetic, creative, respected Singaporeans, some drawn from within the elite public
service, some from the private sector. The EDB has consistently been well staffed
with relevantly qualified people.
Fourthly, Singapore's development strategy has guided almost every aspect of
public sector involvement in the economy of Singapore. As noted, micro-economic
reform designed to improve efficiency is an accepted, priority, on-going feature for
all of the key instrumentalities in Singapore (port, airport, etc). Singapore has
placed a top priority on ensuring that traffic flows smoothly across all roads in
Singapore around the clock each day. Traffic jams and the congestion common to
most major urban centres in Asia are not characteristic of Singapore.
Fifthly, Singapore's achievements vindicate Senior Minister, Lee Kuan Yew's
point that the resources for sustained per capita income growth are now globally
mobile and can be tapped by development and implementation of appropriate
policies. A Smart State can augment its own resource base by appropriately tapping
global resource flows of professional people and of specific activities that
multinational and other large foreign firms may find advantageous to outsource to
Queensland, and by encouraging smaller foreign firms in relevant areas to consider
doing their business in Queensland.
One final point ought be stressed. Singapore's EDB has had some thirty years
of experience in dealing with multinational firms. In the early 1990s, it indicated
that it would act as a business architect for multinational firms attracted to South
East Asia, advising them as to where they ought to locate different activities (for
example, activities that required comparatively unskilled, low-cost labour to
Indonesia, Thailand or Vietnam, activities that required more skilled labour to
Johore in Malaysia, and so on). The EDB said:
We must be able to offer to our multinational clients more than a well-
developed efficient business location. We must offer a total business
solution that addresses key corporate concerns and needs of
multinational firms. The EDB recognises that we must develop a
thorough understanding of our corporate clients business requirements.
We will adopt a developmental perspective towards all of our corporate
clients (EDB 1990a:6).
In further developing the Smart State initiative, a case could be made for cooperating
closely with the EDB, the one institution in the world that has enormous practical
experience in dealing with multinational firms. The prospective signing of a free
trade agreement between Australia and Singapore could well facilitate such a link.
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